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The Economics of Immigration
Reform
Howard F. Chang*
In this article, I draw upon economic theory and recent empirical work
on the economic and fiscal effects of immigration to evaluate some recent
proposals for immigration reform in terms of their effects on the economic
welfare of natives in the United States. In particular, I consider the
Reforming American Immigration for a Strong Economy (“RAISE”) Act, a
bill that would cut immigration to half of its current level. President
Donald Trump has endorsed the RAISE Act and has insisted that many of
its provisions be part of any legislation legalizing the status of
unauthorized immigrants granted relief under the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program. I compare this restrictionist
proposal to the comprehensive immigration reform bill passed by the
Senate in 2013, which would have liberalized admissions to the United
States. I conclude that economic analysis militates in favor of liberalizing
our immigration restrictions, as proposed in 2013, instead of imposing the
drastic new restrictions proposed in the RAISE Act.
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The people of the United States and our elected representatives
remain sharply divided on the issue of immigration. In August 2017,
President Donald Trump announced his support for an immigration
bill introduced by Republican Senators Tom Cotton and David Perdue,
the Reforming American Immigration for a Strong Economy
(“RAISE”) Act.1 If enacted, the RAISE Act would slash legal
immigration drastically, cutting immigration in half within a decade.2
This announcement reveals that President Trump’s hostility toward
immigration is not limited to unauthorized immigration but instead
extends more broadly to legal immigration as well.
In September 2017, the Trump administration announced its
decision to rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(“DACA”) program adopted in 2012 by President Barack Obama for
certain immigrants who immigrated illegally as children.3 The DACA
program provides these unauthorized immigrants temporary but
renewable protection from deportation and authorization for
employment in the United States. Although President Trump urged
Congress to provide these immigrants relief from deportation through
legislation,4 in October 2017, he released a long list of restrictionist
provisions he would demand in exchange for any such relief.5 His long
list of demands includes the new immigration restrictions proposed by
the RAISE Act.6 Restrictionist demands by President Trump and his
Republican allies in Congress have remained obstacles to efforts to
enact legislation granting relief to DACA recipients.7
These proposed restrictions stand in stark contrast to the
comprehensive immigration reform bill passed by the Senate in 2013
with bipartisan support (68-32, with all Democrats and fourteen
1 Reforming American Immigration for a Strong Economy Act, S. 1720, 115th
Cong. (2017); David Nakamura, Trump, GOP Senators Introduce Bill to Slash Legal
Immigration Levels, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-politics/wp/2017/08/02/trump-gop-senators-to-introduce-bill-to-slash-legalimmigration-levels/?utm_term=.903007a09063.
2 See Nakamura, supra note 1.
3 Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to End DACA and Calls
on Congress to Act, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2x7xOo2.
4 Id.
5 Priscilla Alvarez, The White House Lays Out Its Conditions for Extending DACA,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/thewhite-house-lays-out-its-demands-for-daca/542376/.
6 See id.
7 See Alicia Parlapiano, Dreamers’ Fate Is Now Tied to Border Wall and Other
G.O.P. Immigration Demands, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2Bu16i2
(noting that the Senate voted on, but failed to pass, three different immigration plans
due to President Trump’s demands).
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Republicans voting in favor), the Border Security, Economic
Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (“2013 bill”).8 The
Republicans in control of the House of Representatives, however,
never brought the 2013 bill up for a vote, because conservative
members opposed any “amnesty” for unauthorized immigrants.9
Unlike the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would have included several
reforms that would liberalize admissions to the United States.10 Which
of these contrasting approaches would improve our immigration
system?
As the reference to a “Strong Economy” in the title of the RAISE Act
suggests, its proponents tout the bill on economic grounds. What does
economic theory suggest about the effect of immigration on economic
welfare? For the economist, the international migration of workers is
one facet of globalization, which economists understand to mean our
evolution toward a world economy that is integrated across national
boundaries.11 Economists generally welcome the development of such
a global common market, prescribing free trade in goods as the regime
that maximizes global economic welfare. Economists also recommend
liberalized trade as a policy that is likely to produce gains for each
national economy.
Economists also recognize that the same theory that they apply to
international trade in goods also applies to international trade in other
markets.12 Nations can gain from the free movement of not only goods
but also workers because labor mobility allows them to enjoy gains
from international trade in the labor market. We would expect
workers to migrate from economies that offer them low wages to
economies that offer them higher wages. As a result of this migration,
the output of the global economy grows. Higher wages in the country
of immigration imply that the marginal product of labor is higher
8 Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,
S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013); see Ed O’Keefe, Senate Approves Comprehensive
Immigration Bill, WASH. POST (June 27, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/senate-poised-to-approve-massive-immigration-bill/2013/06/27/87168096-df3211e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html?utm_term=.f95da6eeacb2.
9 Ashley Parker & Jonathan Weisman, Republicans in House Resist Overhaul for
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2013), https://nyti.ms/2Nit2Zu.
10 See infra Part III.A.
11 See Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare
and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1148-49 (1997)
[hereinafter Liberalized Immigration].
12 This discussion draws from Howard F. Chang, The Economic Impact of
International Labor Migration: Recent Estimates and Policy Implications, 16 TEMPLE POL.
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 321, 322 (2007) [hereinafter Recent Estimates].
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there than in the country of emigration. That is, higher wages for the
same worker mean that the worker produces more value in the
country of immigration than in the country of emigration. Labor
migration generally leads to net gains for the world as a whole,
because labor flows to the economy where it can produce the most
value. Thus, basic economic theory raises a presumption in favor of
the free movement of workers. Immigration restrictions distort the
global labor market by interfering with the efficient allocation of
workers among national economies, thereby wasting human resources
and generating poverty in countries of emigration.
The greater the inequality in wages among countries, the costlier the
distortion of the global labor market caused by immigration
restrictions, and the greater the gains from liberalizing labor
migration. Given the degree of wage inequality in the world, it should
be apparent that the economic gains from liberalized labor migration
are enormous.13 These considerations militate in favor of liberalized
migration, not reduced levels of migration.
The proponents of the RAISE Act, however, do not seek to promote
global economic welfare. Instead, Senator Perdue looks to the national
interests of the United States, complaining that our current
immigration system “does not meet the needs of our economy.”14
Furthermore, President Trump makes clear that he discounts the
interests of prospective immigrants when he weighs the costs and
benefits of immigration reforms. He claims that the RAISE Act would
replace current immigration policies with a system that “puts America
first.”15
What light does the economic literature shed on these claims
regarding our national economic welfare? Suppose we were to set
aside the interests of immigrants and instead adopt the “America first”
perspective suggested by President Trump and other advocates of the
RAISE Act. In this article, I will focus narrowly on the effects of our
current flow of immigrants on the economic welfare of natives, that is,
those born in the United States. This article draws upon economic
theory and recent empirical work on the economic and fiscal effects of
immigration into the United States and evaluates these recent

13 For surveys of some empirical estimates of these gains, see id. at 323-24 and
Michael A. Clemens, Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?,
25 J. ECON. PERSP. 83, 83-87 (2011).
14 Peter Baker, Trump Supports Plan to Cut Legal Immigration by Half, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 2, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2hnAref (quoting Sen. Perdue).
15 Id. (quoting President Trump).
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proposals for immigration reform in terms of their effects on the
economic welfare of natives.
In Part I, I will review estimates of the economic and fiscal benefits
of immigration, which suggest that liberalizing rather than restricting
access to immigrant visas would serve the economic interests of
natives. In Part II, I rebut claims that the RAISE Act would serve the
national interest by improving the selection of immigrants. In Part III,
I compare the RAISE Act with the comprehensive immigration reform
bill passed by the Senate in 2013, which would have liberalized
admissions to the United States. I discuss how the 2013 bill would do
a better job of serving the economic interest of natives than the RAISE
Act. In Part IV, I conclude that economic analysis militates in favor of
liberalizing our restrictive immigration laws instead of imposing new
restrictions like those proposed in the RAISE Act, suggesting that the
2013 bill provides a much more promising framework for
comprehensive immigration reform.
I.

NET BENEFITS FOR NATIVES FROM IMMIGRATION

Would the effects of immigrant workers in the labor market be in
the economic interest of natives? Economists agree that the effect of
immigrant workers in the labor market is on balance positive for
natives as a group. If we examine the effects of immigrants in the labor
market, we find that the natives of the country of immigration, taken
together, will on balance gain from the immigration of workers.16
Natives enjoy a net gain from employing immigrant workers: they gain
a surplus in excess of what they pay immigrants for their labor. In
2014, the economist George Borjas produced a range of crude
estimates for the surplus that natives enjoy as a result of the
participation of immigrants in our labor market, and using a variety of
assumptions, he derives estimates ranging from $2.6 billion to $201.8
billion in income every year.17
Even as natives enjoy net benefits from immigrant workers in the
labor market, however, immigrants may still pose a risk of a fiscal
burden on natives through the public treasury. In fact, Senator Cotton
cites the threat of a fiscal burden in defense of the RAISE Act. He
claims that many immigrants are a “net cost to our economy because
of the transfer payments” they receive through “public assistance”

16

Chang, Recent Estimates, supra note 12, at 324-25.
GEORGE J. BORJAS, IMMIGRATION ECONOMICS 158 (2014) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION
ECONOMICS].
17
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programs.18 President Trump claims that the RAISE Act would “save
taxpayers billions and billions of dollars.”19 The empirical evidence,
however, suggests that immigrants generally confer a fiscal benefit
rather than impose a fiscal burden on natives.
A. Fiscal Impact
In 1997, the National Research Council (“NRC”) conducted the first
study to attempt a comprehensive calculation of the fiscal impact of
immigration in the United States, taking into account the
contributions made to tax revenues and the costs imposed on the
public treasury not only by the immigrants themselves but also by
their descendants.20 The NRC generated a range of estimates for the
total fiscal impact, including the effects at the state level as well as
those at the federal level, using a variety of assumptions.21 Using the
most reasonable set of assumptions for its “baseline” scenario, the
NRC found that the average recent immigrant in 1996 had a positive
fiscal impact of $80,000 in net present value in 1996 dollars.22
More recently, in 2017, the National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine (“National Academies”) updated those
NRC estimates, accounting for changes in circumstances over the
intervening two decades.23 The National Academies generate a range
of estimates of the total fiscal impact of immigration in the United
States, again using a wide variety of assumptions.24 Although the
National Academies use more conservative assumptions than used for

18 Peter M. Robinson, Senator Tom Cotton, Immigration Reform, and the RAISE Act,
HOOVER INST. (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.hoover.org/research/senator-tom-cottonimmigration-reform-and-raise-act (quoting Sen. Cotton).
19 Andrew V. Pestano, Trump Unveils Merit-Based Immigration Bill Favoring
English-Speaking Applicants, UPI (Aug. 2, 2017, 1:27 PM), https://upi.com/6615402
(quoting President Trump).
20 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND
FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 302 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997)
[hereinafter NRC] (noting that “we must include in the calculation changes in taxes
and expenditures associated not only with the immigrant, but also with her
descendants”).
21 See id. at 337.
22 See id. at 325-26, 336-37.
23 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL CONSEQUENCES
OF IMMIGRATION 413 (Francine D. Blau & Christopher Mackie eds., 2017) [hereinafter
NATIONAL ACADEMIES] (noting that “both immigrants and government budgets have
changed since the mid-1990s, when a similar exercise was undertaken”).
24 See generally id. at 428-60 (providing a variety of estimates).
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the NRC’s baseline scenario,25 they nevertheless generate estimates
showing that current immigrants have a much greater positive fiscal
impact than they did twenty years ago. Under the set of assumptions
that most closely approximates the NRC’s baseline scenario, the
National Academies found that the average recent immigrant has a
positive fiscal impact of $279,000 in net present value in 2012
dollars.26 That is, even after accounting for inflation, the fiscal benefit
conferred by the average immigrant has more than doubled in the past
twenty years.27
Unlike the NRC report, the National Academies report presents a
wide range of estimates without identifying a single set of assumptions
as the most reasonable to use as a baseline scenario. The more agnostic
stance adopted by the National Academies may be a response to
objections raised by the economist George Borjas, who has disputed
the assumptions adopted by the NRC for its baseline scenario.28 Borjas
served on both the panel that produced the 1997 NRC report and the
panel that produced the 2017 National Academies report.29 Given the
relatively agnostic stance adopted by the National Academies, a closer
examination of the assumptions adopted by the NRC is useful for
understanding how the assumptions underlying the NRC baseline
scenario are more reasonable than the alternatives and why
immigration confers such a large fiscal benefit on natives in the United
States.
1.

Public Goods

First, the NRC notes that “a larger population helps to bear the costs
of so-called public goods — those that provide services to all in the
population at a cost that does not rise with the size of the
population.”30 As any introductory economics textbook explains, the
defining features of a “public good” are that “people cannot be
25

For an extended discussion of these assumptions, see infra Part I.A.2.
See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 446.
27 According to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) calculated by the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, $279,000 in 2012 dollars is equivalent to about $191,000 in 1996
dollars. See BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, TABLE 24: HISTORICAL CONSUMER
PRICE INDEX FOR ALL URBAN CONSUMERS (CPI-U), at 4 (2017), https://www.bls.gov/
cpi/tables/historical-cpi-u-201709.pdf.
28 See GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN’S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY 124-25 (1999) [hereinafter HEAVEN’S DOOR] (objecting to the NRC
assumptions about future fiscal policies).
29 NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at v; NRC, supra note 20, at iii.
30 NRC, supra note 20, at 302.
26
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prevented from using a public good” and that “one person’s use of a
public good does not reduce another person’s ability to use it.”31 A
classic textbook example of a public good is national defense, because
“it is impossible to prevent any single person from enjoying the benefit
of this defense,” and “when one person enjoys the benefit of national
defense, he does not reduce the benefit to anyone else.”32 That is, a
pure public good like national defense is not subject to congestion and
is thus not “rival in consumption.”33 The NRC notes that other public
goods include “research on health and science.”34
The NRC distinguishes these public goods from other government
services, such as “services from roads, sewers, police and fire
departments, libraries, airports, and foreign embassies,” which “are
highly congestible.”35 Insofar as immigration increases the population
served, a larger population would “crowd the existing social
infrastructure, including roads, libraries, airports, sewage and water
supply systems, and public buildings,” and these “congestion costs”
would require a government to increase its expenditures to maintain
the same quality of service for natives.36 Therefore, the NRC treats
these goods “as if immigrants raise both the demand for them and the
cost of meeting that demand, in proportion to their numbers.”37 The
different treatment of public goods has a significant effect on the
NRC’s calculations. For example, if the NRC were to treat public
goods as if they were “congestible goods,” then the NRC would have
concluded that the average immigrant imposes a net fiscal cost of
$5,000 rather than providing a net fiscal benefit of $80,000 in net
present value in 1996 dollars.38 This important effect is no surprise, as
noted by the National Academies, because “public goods such as
national defense represent a large part of the federal budget.”39
The National Academies also note that “interest on the national
debt” may be treated as a pure public good.40 The federal government

31

N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 226 (5th ed. 2008).
Id. at 228.
33 Id.
34 NRC, supra note 20, at 302; see MANKIW, supra note 31, at 229 (noting that
basic research is also a public good).
35 NRC, supra note 20, at 303.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 346.
39 NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 357. National defense alone “accounts
for about 18 percent of the U.S. federal budget.” Id. at 345.
40 Id. at 345.
32
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would owe this interest on a certain stock of debt that would exist
even in the absence of more immigration. These interest payments
“represent the cost of servicing debt attributable to past spending and
deficits from which new immigrants did not benefit.”41 As the NRC
notes, “a larger population helps to bear the burden of the preexisting
public debt through tax payments to cover interest or repayment
charges.”42 Treating interest payments as a public good has an
important effect. For example, if the NRC were to treat them as a
“private good” rather than as a public good, then the NRC would have
concluded that the average immigrant provides a net fiscal benefit of
only $31,000 rather than $80,000 in net present value in 1996
dollars.43
The National Academies agrees that “it is reasonable to omit the per
capita cost of pure public goods, such as national defense, for the
incremental cost to government of a single additional citizen,” because
“the addition of a single citizen through immigration or birth cannot
plausibly increase defense spending” or spending on any other pure
public good.44 The National Academies report, however, presents
many estimates based on scenarios that treat public goods as if they
were private goods subject to congestion.45 With this change in
assumptions, the National Academies would conclude that the average
recent immigrant provides a net fiscal benefit of only $195,000 rather
than $279,000 in net present value in 2012 dollars.46
Thus, the National Academies report presents some estimates based
on the false assumption that public goods are private goods. Why
present these estimates as if they were as plausible as those based on
the assumption that public goods are public goods? The National
Academies report offers a peculiar explanation, claiming that “for
larger increases in population through sustained immigration,” it may
be better to assume that “spending on public goods” increases “with

41

Id. at 364.
NRC, supra note 20, at 302-03.
43 Id. at 345.
44 NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 461-62.
45 See id. at 364, 394-95. For example, the first four of eight scenarios presented
assume that immigrants “incur the average cost of public goods,” as if they were
congestible private goods. Id. at 364. The report presents five tables of estimates for
the fiscal impact of immigrants and their descendants. See id. at 445-59. Two of these
tables treat public goods as if they were private goods. See id. at 454-59.
46 Compare id. at 446 (estimating net fiscal benefit of $279,000 when public goods
are excluded), with id. at 455 (estimating benefit of $195,000 when public goods are
included).
42
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the resulting population.”47 The only support the report offers for this
alternative assumption is the empirical claim that “over time, public
goods such as defense spending have been correlated with gross
domestic product (GDP) and population size.”48
The report’s alternative assumption here is based on a non sequitur.
Even if we assume that the empirical claim is true, this observation
would not imply that public goods should be treated as if they were
private goods subject to congestion. If a nation decides to increase its
spending on a pure public good like national defense or basic research,
then the government does not do so because congestion requires an
increase in spending to maintain the same level of the relevant service
to its residents. Rather, the nation is choosing to take the fiscal benefit
generated by a larger population and spend that extra tax revenue on a
higher level of service to be enjoyed by each of its residents. That is,
the nation chooses to consume that fiscal benefit, say, in the form of a
stronger national defense, or in more resources devoted to a search for
a cure for cancer. This higher spending buys benefits that the nation
deems to be greater than the fiscal costs.49 In other words, the nation
would be responding to a lower cost per capita for the same quantity
of pure public goods by choosing to buy more of those goods, which
would increase benefits for all residents, including natives and their
descendants. Far from imposing any incremental costs on natives,
more immigrants would allow natives to consume a larger stream of
benefits from pure public goods while maintaining the same cost per
capita for those goods. Thus, the NRC adopted the most reasonable
treatment of public goods for its baseline scenario, and the alternative
assumptions considered by the National Academies are based on an
error in reasoning.
2.

The National Debt

To generate estimates of fiscal impact, the NRC also had to make
some assumptions about future fiscal policies in order to make
realistic projections regarding future taxes and expenditures.50 As the
47

Id. at 462.
Id. at 345.
49 If a citizen disagrees and regards the spending to be a waste of money, then that
citizen has a quarrel with the government’s spending decisions, not with its
immigration policy. If immigration causes population growth, this growth still does
not compel the nation to spend any more than the government already spends on pure
public goods.
50 This discussion draws on observations made by Howard F. Chang, Introduction,
in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IMMIGRATION, at xi, xxxii-xxxiii (Howard F. Chang ed.,
48
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NRC explains, “any government faces an overall constraint on its
ability to use deficit finance,” which implies that no government can
“let its debt grow without limit relative to the economy.”51 The
problem confronting the NRC is that under “current fiscal rules” in
the United States, “tax and expenditure policies will cause the debt to
explode over time.”52 Therefore, the NRC assumes that the federal
government brings the growth of the national debt under control
through “a future fiscal adjustment,” that is, through “changes in taxes
and expenditures” that stabilize “the ratio of debt to GDP . . . at some
point.”53
George Borjas objects to this assumption, which he argues “builds in
the conclusion: immigration is beneficial because the country can
spread the pain of a large tax bill over a larger population.”54 This
conclusion, however, is not built into the NRC’s assumption so much
as it is built into economic reality under the circumstances. The NRC
explains that the alternative scenario, in which “debt never has to be
controlled,” is unreasonable because this alternative “clearly leads to
unrealistic debt levels.”55
The NRC’s assumption is important to the calculation of the fiscal
impact of the average immigrant. When the NRC adopts the
alternative assumption, with no “budget adjustment,” the NRC
projects that the average immigrant imposes a modest net fiscal
burden of $15,000 rather than providing a net fiscal benefit of $80,000
in net present value in 1996 dollars.56 Yet, even if we were to adopt
this alternative scenario, in which “debt never has to be controlled,”
then natives would never have to bear this supposed $15,000 fiscal
burden through tax increases or spending cuts because this scenario
assumes that the government can borrow without limit.57 Indeed, this
scenario assumes that “the debt is allowed to grow with neither tax
increases nor benefit cuts,” so that by assumption natives bear no
increased tax burden as a result of immigration.58 Instead, in this
scenario, taxpayers would avoid bearing this supposed $15,000 fiscal
burden by borrowing, increasing the national debt without limit, and
2015) [hereinafter Introduction].
51 NRC, supra note 20, at 299.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 BORJAS, HEAVEN’S DOOR, supra note 28, at 125.
55 NRC, supra note 20, at 338.
56 Id. at 337.
57 See id. at 338.
58 Id.
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making “all interest payments . . . by borrowing rather than by raising
taxes.”59 This scenario is hardly what restrictionists have in mind
when they claim that immigration imposes a burden on taxpayers.60
Thus, for immigration to impose any fiscal burden on taxpayers that
they cannot avoid by borrowing, a scenario must assume that a budget
constraint ultimately imposes some limit on debt, so that more deficit
spending today requires more fiscal restraint at some point in the
future. The NRC appropriately makes such an assumption in its
“baseline scenario.”61 Once a projection makes such a “fiscal
sustainability” assumption, however, then the net fiscal impacts of
immigrants must be “greater in a positive direction,” precisely because
immigrants and their descendants would help shoulder the burden of
“future spending cuts and tax increases.”62 This effect is why the NRC
finds that a future budget adjustment implies an improved fiscal
impact for the average immigrant. As soon as a scenario acknowledges
that deficits have consequences for future taxpayers, the calculations
must include the value of immigrants and their descendants as
taxpayers who will share the future burden of the national debt. For
this reason, a nation in debt should eagerly welcome more newcomers,
who will help pay for the debts that natives have incurred through the
public sector. The unrealistic alternative in which “debt never has to
be controlled” is a scenario in which taxpayers do not need to bear any
burden as a result of debt and thus “the effects of debt sharing are
inconsequential.”63
The National Academies report fails to include any scenario with a
budget constraint like that adopted by the NRC’s baseline scenario.
59

Id.
For example, President Trump claims that the cuts to legal immigration
proposed by the RAISE Act would “save taxpayers billions and billions of dollars.”
Pestano, supra note 19 (quoting President Trump).
61 NRC, supra note 20, at 325. The NRC considers different assumptions for the
timing of a future fiscal adjustment and finds that delaying this adjustment into the
future increases the net present value of the average immigrant. See id. at 337-38.
Thus, although the NRC baseline scenario assumed that fiscal adjustments would hold
the debt/GDP ratio fixed starting twenty years later, in 2016, this assumption yields a
relatively conservative estimate of the fiscal benefit conferred by the average
immigrant in 1996, given that the national debt is now growing at an unsustainable
rate. See Thomas Kaplan, Federal Budget Deficit Projected to Soar to Over $1 Trillion in
2020, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2Hna41c (reporting that according to
the Congressional Budget Office, the national debt is now on track to reach 96% of
GDP by 2028, rising to “a higher level than any point since just after World War II
and well past the level that economists say could court a crisis”).
62 NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 461.
63 NRC, supra note 20, at 338.
60
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Instead, the National Academies report uses three different budget
scenarios,64 and “all three of these scenarios assume unsustainable
increases in deficits and debt over time.”65 Therefore, all three
scenarios limit the fiscal benefit that immigrants and their descendants
would contribute to deficit reduction or debt service and thus build in
a bias against a positive fiscal impact from immigration. In this sense,
all of the estimates reported by the National Academies are based on
budget assumptions more conservative than used by the NRC baseline
scenario. The National Academies scenario that comes the closest to
fiscal sustainability is the “Deficit Reduction” scenario, which assumes
some “tax increases and spending cuts” that at least reduce “the gap
between federal spending and revenue.”66 The Deficit Reduction
scenario that also treats public goods properly (that is, as public
goods) is the scenario that predicts that the average recent immigrant
confers a net fiscal benefit of $279,000 in net present value in 2012
dollars.67 Although this prediction is the largest positive estimate
presented by the National Academies report, even this estimate is at
best a lower bound on what the appropriate calculation would derive
using more reasonable assumptions regarding future budget
adjustments.
All estimates of fiscal impact presented by the National Academies
are conservative estimates, not only because they all derive from
scenarios that fail to impose any budget constraint on borrowing, but
also because they all measure “the future net fiscal impact of an
immigrant and descendants over a 75-year time horizon.”68 For a
nation engaged in deficit spending, which shifts tax burdens to future
generations, any calculation based on a limited time horizon will
include the fiscal burden imposed by the current generation while
excluding the fiscal benefit of future generations who must pay taxes
to service the debt that they inherit. Thus, a limited time horizon
biases the estimates of net fiscal impact in a negative direction,
because much of the fiscal benefit of the average immigrant derives
from the fiscal benefits produced in the more distant future. The NRC
reports that after seventy-five years, the United States would realize
only fifty-three percent of the long-run net present value of the fiscal
benefit ultimately conferred by an immigrant and the immigrant’s
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NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 410-12.
Id. at 438.
Id. at 411 (describing the “Deficit Reduction” scenario).
Id. at 446.
Id. at 410.
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descendants.69 These estimates indicate that the net fiscal benefit of
the average recent immigrant over a seventy-five-year time horizon has
more than quadrupled in real terms over the past twenty years.70
These considerations also suggest that if the National Academies had
performed a calculation based on more appropriate assumptions, like
those used by the NRC in its baseline scenario, the total long-run net
present value of the fiscal benefit ultimately conferred by the average
immigrant would prove to be more than double the $279,000 estimate
presented in the National Academies report. Thus, that figure
represents a very conservative estimate for the fiscal benefit conferred
by the average immigrant today.
B. Costly Backlogs and the Case for Liberalized Quotas
In short, the economic literature suggests that natives on balance
gain from immigration under current policies. If anything, the
estimated economic and fiscal impacts of immigration militate in favor
of higher levels of immigration, not lower levels. If we consider federal
immigration laws from the perspective of economics, then the primary
problem with our current admissions policies is that they are they are
unduly restrictive. We have made it far too difficult for valuable
workers and taxpayers to enter the United States. Quotas severely limit
the supply of visas well below the demand for these visas and thereby
create costly backlogs for those waiting for their immigration visas.
A glance at the Visa Bulletin from the U.S. State Department for May
2018 reveals the magnitude of the problem for various categories of
immigration visas. For example, brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens
receiving immigration visas waited at least thirteen years for their
visas.71 Married sons or daughters of U.S. citizens waited at least
twelve years for their visas.72 All categories of family-based
69 See NRC, supra note 20, at 343. This figure implies that over a 75-year time
horizon, the United States would realize only $42,400 of the $80,000 net present value
that the NRC predicts as the net fiscal benefit of the average immigrant.
70 See supra notes 27, 69. The NRC and the National Academies both use a three
percent real discount rate to calculate net present values. NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra
note 23, at 413 (using “a relatively conservative real discount rate of [three] percent”);
NRC, supra note 20, at 325 (using three percent for the baseline scenario and other
rates for alternative scenarios).
71 The sponsors for these immigrants filed their visa petitions no later than
October 1, 2004. See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFF., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN:
IMMIGRANT NUMBERS FOR MAY 2018, at 2 (2018), https://travel.state.gov/content/
dam/visas/Bulletins/visabulletin_May2018.pdf.
72 The sponsors for these immigrants filed their visa petitions no later than
February 1, 2006. See id.
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immigration subject to quotas have backlogs, even spouses and minor
children of lawful permanent resident aliens.73
Furthermore, our immigration system also includes quotas that limit
the number of these immigration visas available to any one country,
and these quotas are completely insensitive to the population and to
the demand for these visas in that country.74 These country quotas
require our admissions process to discriminate against some
applicants based on their national origin if they come from one of the
countries that send us the greatest number of immigrants. Thus, if the
sibling of a U.S. citizen comes from Mexico, then the wait is even
worse than it is for most countries: that Mexican sibling has waited
twenty years for a visa.75 If that sibling comes from the Philippines,
then the wait is even longer: that sibling has waited more than twentythree years for a visa.76
These country quotas not only aggravate backlogs for familysponsored immigration visas but also create backlogs for employmentbased immigration visas. For natives of India, even skilled workers
and professionals have waited ten years for an employer-sponsored
visa.77 Even professionals holding advanced degrees or workers with
exceptional ability from India will have waited more than nine years,
and those from China will have waited more than three years.78 These
preference categories already reserve most employer-sponsored
immigration visas for skilled workers with offers of employment, who
are likely to contribute to the public treasury by paying income taxes
and unlikely to rely on any means-tested entitlement programs.79
Their immigration is especially likely to promote the economic welfare
of those of us already here.

73 The sponsors of these spouses and children filed their visa petitions no later
than June 1, 2016. See id.
74 See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(2) (2018) (placing limits on the total number of familysponsored and employment-based immigrant visas per country).
75 The sponsors of these immigrants filed their visa petitions on January 8, 1998.
See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFF., supra note 71.
76 The sponsors of these immigrants filed their visa petitions on February 1, 1995.
See id.
77 The employers of these immigrants applied or filed on May 1, 2018. See id.
78 The employers of these Indian immigrants applied or filed on December 22,
2018, and the employers of these Chinese immigrants applied or filed on September 1,
2014. See id.
79 See Howard F. Chang, Migration as International Trade: The Economic Gains
from the Liberalized Movement of Labor, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 371, 397
(1998) [hereinafter Migration as International Trade].
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In fact, the studies conducted by the NRC and the National
Academies found that age at the time of admission is an important
factor determining the total fiscal impact of an immigrant.80 In general,
the younger the immigrant at the time of arrival, the more years the
immigrant can spend working in the United States, the more tax
revenues the immigrant will contribute to public coffers prior to
retirement, and the more positive the immigrant’s total fiscal impact.81
In fact, immigrants to the United States are often young adults who
will not participate in entitlement programs for the elderly for many
years.82
The older the immigrant at the time of entry, the less the immigrant
will pay in taxes over the immigrant’s remaining years in this country,
and the less favorable the fiscal impact of that immigrant. So longer
backlogs make not only the immigrants but also natives worse off.
Long waiting periods mean that immigrants enter later in life, limiting
the years during which they can contribute to our economic welfare
by providing labor as workers and by paying taxes to the public
treasury.
II.

SELECTING IMMIGRANTS

One might think that the obvious solution to the problem of excess
demand for immigration visas would be to increase the visa supply,
which would allow immigrants to enter while still young and thereby
increase their economic and fiscal contributions to the welfare of
natives. Liberalized quotas would improve the fiscal impact of each
immigrant who enters more quickly as well as increase the influx of
valuable workers and taxpayers. So how do the proponents of the
RAISE Act justify reductions in the flow of immigrants instead of
liberalizing reforms? Senator Cotton complains that “so many
immigrants enter this country without job skills, or with very few
skills,” so that they are “less likely to pay taxes” and “more likely to
80 See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 445-59; NRC, supra note 20, at 350
(noting that “the fiscal impact of an immigrant varies widely depending on age at
arrival in the United States”).
81 See NRC, supra note 20, at 328-35; see also NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23,
at 445-59.
82 See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 417 (noting that “our forecast of . . .
net fiscal impact begins at a more advantageous age for government budgets” because
“an average new immigrant today is more likely to be of working age than 20 years
ago”); NRC, supra note 20, at 353 (“The average fiscal impact of immigrants under the
baseline assumptions is positive in part because they tend to arrive at young working
ages . . . .”).
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use public assistance.”83 The virtue of the cuts imposed by the RAISE
Act, according to this rationale, is that they exclude categories of
immigrants likely to impose a fiscal burden.
A. Fiscal Effects
In particular, the RAISE Act would cut family-sponsored
immigration by eliminating visas for siblings and adult children of U.S.
citizens, perversely eliminating precisely those visa categories that face
the greatest excess demand.84 Family-sponsored immigration accounts
for most legal immigrants to the United States.85 Proponents of the
RAISE Act, however, offer no empirical evidence that these familysponsored immigrants impose a net fiscal burden. Furthermore, the
RAISE Act would also replace existing categories of employment-based
immigration with a system that awards points based on education, the
ability to speak English, high-paying job offers, and age.86 According
to an estimate reported by the New York Times, only two percent of
adult U.S. citizens would pass the thirty-point minimum required by
this points system.87
These drastic cuts to immigration go far beyond anything justified
by the prospect of a fiscal burden and would instead exclude many
immigrants who would have a positive impact on the economic
welfare of natives. Estimates by the National Research Council in 1997
and by the National Academies in 2017 both indicate that we can
expect the average immigrant with at least a high-school education to
have a positive fiscal impact overall, including the fiscal impact of
their descendants.88 Only twenty-one percent of recent immigrants
who are twenty-five years old or older have less than a high-school
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Robinson, supra note 18 (quoting Sen. Cotton).
See Reforming American Immigration for a Strong Economy Act, S. 1720, 115th
Cong. § 4 (2017); Nakamura, supra note 1.
85 See Baker, supra note 14 (reporting that family-sponsored immigrants
accounted for sixty-four percent of immigrants to the United States in 2014).
86 See S. 1720 § 5; Julia Gelatt, The RAISE Act: Dramatic Change to Family Immigration,
Less So for the Employment-Based System, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Aug. 2017),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/raise-act-dramatic-change-family-immigration-lessso-employment-based-system.
87 Quoctrung Bui, How Many Americans Would Pass an Immigration Test Endorsed
by Trump?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/
08/23/upshot/immigration-quiz-raise-act-trump.html.
88 See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 446; NRC, supra note 20, at 334.
84
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education, and fifty-five percent of these immigrants have more than a
high-school education.89
B. Income Distribution
Proponents argue that the least skilled immigrants not only pose a
risk of a fiscal burden but also drive down wages for the least skilled
native workers. President Trump claims that “the RAISE Act will give
American workers a pay raise by reducing unskilled immigration.”90
Similarly, Trump’s policy adviser Stephen Miller defended the
exclusion of “low-skill workers” as based on “compassion for
American workers.”91 Immigration restrictions, according to this
theory, protect native workers from foreign competition and thereby
raise their wages. Does this protectionist theory provide a sound
justification for restrictive immigration policies?
1.

Wage Effects

Studies of the effects of immigration in U.S. labor markets have
shown little evidence of any significant effects on native wages or
employment, even for the least skilled native workers. When the
National Academies surveyed the vast economic literature studying
the wage effects of immigration in the United States, it concluded that
“native dropouts tend to be more negatively affected by immigration
than better-educated natives,” but “when measured over a period of
more than 10 years, the impact of immigration on the wages of natives
overall is very small.”92 In fact, “[e]stimated negative effects tend to be
smaller (or even positive) over longer periods of time (10 years or
more).”93
Why does the entry of immigrant workers have so little effect on the
wages of native workers? One reason is that the demand for labor does
not remain fixed when immigrants enter the economy. Immigrant
workers not only supply labor but also demand goods and services,
and this demand will generate greater demand for locally supplied

89

NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 415.
Sheldon Richman, Unskilled Immigrants Do Not Harm Americans, AM. INST.
ECON. RES. (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.aier.org/research/unskilled-immigrants-donot-harm-americans (quoting President Trump).
91 Baker, supra note 14 (quoting Stephen Miller).
92 NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 267.
93 Id. For another survey of this literature, see Chang, Introduction, supra note 50,
at xv-xxvii.
90
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labor.94 Furthermore, the entry of immigrant workers will increase
profits for owners of capital in the sectors of the economy employing
those workers, which will stimulate more investment in those sectors.
The expansion of these sectors of the economy will also increase the
demand for the types of labor employed in those sectors, which in
turn would tend to offset the wage effects of increased labor supply.95
Furthermore, the empirical evidence indicates that immigrant
workers and native workers are imperfect substitutes in the labor
market, so they often do not compete for the same jobs. In fact,
immigrants in the United States tend to specialize in some occupations
while natives specialize in others, based on the comparative advantage
enjoyed by natives in English language skills.96 Thus, immigrant
workers compete with one another far more than they compete with
native workers. Indeed, immigrant workers may complement rather
than compete with native workers, so that the net effect of an influx of
immigrants may be to increase the demand for native labor and
thereby increase native wages rather than depress them.97
To the extent economists do find any evidence of a negative impact,
it seems largely confined to natives with less than a high-school
education and at most suggests a reason to worry about the
immigration of workers with less than a high-school education.98
Given the small effects of immigration on native wages, however,
protectionist policies seem particularly misguided. Like trade barriers,
immigration restrictions sacrifice gains from trade and thus reduce the
total wealth of natives in the country of immigration. If immigration
restrictions confer any benefit on any native worker, they do so only
by inflicting a larger cost on other natives. In this sense, protectionist
immigration restrictions would be a costly way to transfer wealth from
some natives to other natives.

94

See Chang, Liberalized Immigration, supra note 11, at 1184.
See Howard F. Chang, Immigration Restriction as Redistributive Taxation:
Working Women and the Costs of Protectionism in the Labor Market, 5 J.L. ECON. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 9 (2009) [hereinafter Redistributive Taxation].
96 See Giovanni Peri & Chad Sparber, Task Specialization, Immigration, and Wages,
1 AM. ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 135, 145 (2009).
97 See Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano & Giovanni Peri, Rethinking the Effect of
Immigration on Wages, 10 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 152, 187 (2012) (presenting estimates in
which most, or all, native workers experienced economic gain from the immigration
of workers to the United States from 1990 to 2006).
98 See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 267 (noting that “some studies have
found sizable negative short-run wage impacts for high school dropouts” whereas
other studies have found “small to zero effects”).
95
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Tax Reform as a Less Costly Response to Income Inequality

To the extent that we are worried about after-tax income inequality,
we could probably do more good at lower cost through progressive tax
reforms than we can through new immigration restrictions.99 We
could transfer the same wealth through the tax system rather than
through protectionism and probably would thereby make all classes of
natives better off than they would be under more restrictive
immigration policies because immigration yields a net gain for natives
as a group.100 Given the small adverse effects of immigration and the
small number of native workers who may find their wages reduced by
the influx of immigrant labor, a fairly small increase in the
progressivity of our tax rates would suffice to offset any increase in
income inequality among natives resulting from immigration.
Redistribution through the tax system, of course, is not costless.
Raising taxes on those with high incomes to make those with lower
incomes better off will reduce the incentives for taxpayers to earn
more income. Redistributive taxes would distort the incentives to
work, to save, and to invest. These costly distortions, however, are
inherent in any redistribution to address income inequality, whether
the redistribution occurs through the tax system or through restrictive
immigration policies. For example, if immigration restrictions reduce
the return to capital or make wealthy natives less well off because they
find the services they use to be more costly when fewer immigrant
workers are available,101 then we have reduced the incentives to invest
or to become wealthy. If immigration restrictions really do increase
the wages of high-school dropouts relative to more educated workers,
then they also reduce the incentives for students to complete high
school and to invest in human capital. Immigration restrictions cause
the same costly distortions as redistributive taxes would, and in
addition, they sacrifice the gains that natives would enjoy from
employing immigrants in the labor market.102 Immigration restrictions
99 For a more extended discussion setting forth this thesis, see generally Chang,
Redistributive Taxation, supra note 95.
100 See id. at 11-12.
101 See Patricia Cortes, The Effect of Low-Skilled Immigration on U.S. Prices: Evidence
from CPI Data, 116 J. POL. ECON. 381, 382 (2008) (finding that “low-skilled
immigration lowers the prices of immigrant-intensive services such as gardening,
housekeeping, babysitting, and dry cleaning”).
102 For a more general statement of the principle applied here, see Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 667, 667-68 (1994) (noting that “using legal
rules to redistribute income distorts work incentives fully as much as the income tax

132

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 52:111

needlessly introduce a second distortion on top of the distortion that
is inherent in income redistribution.
This double distortion need not increase the cost of redistribution,
however, if the two distortions “counteract one another.”103 In theory,
the second distortion might mitigate the first distortion and thereby
reduce the efficiency costs of redistribution. As I have noted in prior
work, however, the empirical evidence on the effects of immigration
“gives us ample reason to think that protectionist immigration
restrictions introduce additional distortions that instead aggravate the
distortion in work incentives associated with redistribution.”104 In
particular, this evidence indicates that immigration restrictions drive
up the cost of “services demanded disproportionately by households
with working women” such as child care, food preparation, and
housekeeping.105 The participation of working women in the labor
force “is particularly sensitive to economic incentives.”106 This
disparate impact on households in which both spouses work is
especially likely to discourage work, which implies that “protectionist
immigration restrictions distort labor supply more than necessary” to
redistribute income from the wealthy to the poor.107 Thus, the special
distortions introduced by immigration restrictions aggravate the
system — because the distortion is caused by the redistribution itself — and also
creates inefficiencies in the activities regulated by the legal rules”).
103 Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1017 (2001).
104 Chang, Redistributive Taxation, supra note 95, at 16.
105 Id. at 17-18.
106 Id. at 16.
107 Id. at 19. After the publication of Chang, Redistributive Taxation, supra note 95,
several studies by economists soon supplied empirical evidence confirming the
predicted effects of immigration on female labor supply in various countries. See, e.g.,
Guglielmo Barone & Sauro Mocetti, With a Little Help from Abroad: The Effect of LowSkilled Immigration on the Female Labor Supply, 18 J. LAB. ECON. 664, 669 (2011)
(finding that immigrants are significantly and positively associated with hours worked
by “highly educated” native women in Italy); Patricia Cortes & Jessica Pan,
Outsourcing Household Production: Foreign Domestic Workers and Native Labor Supply
in Hong Kong, 31 J. LAB. ECON. 327, 331 (2013) (finding that the admission of foreign
domestic workers increased the labor force participation of mothers with young
children in Hong Kong); Patricia Cortes & Jose Tessada, Low-Skilled Immigration and
the Labor Supply of Highly Skilled Women, 3 AM. ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 88, 90 (2011)
(finding that low-skilled immigration has a positive and statistically significant effect
on hours worked for working women in the United States); Lidia Farre et al.,
Immigration, Family Responsibilities and the Labor Supply of Skilled Native Women, 11
B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 31 (2011) (finding that female immigrants increase
the employment of college-educated native women with young children). For a survey
of this literature, see Chang, Introduction, supra note 50, at xxix-xxx.
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distortions inherent in income redistribution, supplying even more
reasons to favor redistribution through the tax system instead.
C. Rising Skill Levels Among Immigrants
In any event, if we are worried about the effects of the least skilled
immigrants in our labor market, then new restrictions on legal
immigration are misguided for another reason: most immigrants with
less than a high-school education have immigrated without
authorization, not legally.108 Furthermore, although one would hardly
know it, given the alarmist tenor of the debate over immigration, the
flow of unauthorized immigrants into the United States has slowed to
a trickle during the past decade. In fact, the unauthorized population
has shrunk in absolute terms since 2007, after rising steadily during
the preceding two decades.109 Net illegal immigration has been
negative since the Great Recession, and lower fertility and improved
economies in Latin America make this new reality likely to persist into
the future.110 It is no coincidence that the population of less skilled
immigrants has also become stable during the past decade, after
growing dramatically during the preceding two decades.111
In short, the RAISE Act, President Trump’s proposed “border wall,”
and other costly and draconian proposals to increase border security112
are misguided reactions to a perceived unskilled influx that largely no
longer exists. The fiscal impact of the average immigrant has improved
dramatically over the past twenty years precisely because immigrants
are now more educated than ever before.113 The RAISE Act is based on
108 In 2013, “nearly two-thirds of the U.S. foreign-born adult population with 12 or
fewer years of schooling” were unauthorized immigrants. Gordon Hanson et al., The
Rise and Fall of U.S. Low-Skilled Immigration 1, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 23753, 2017).
109 See id. at 1 (reporting that the unauthorized immigrant population “declined in
absolute terms between 2007 and 2014, falling on net by an annual average of 160,000
individuals” after growing from 1990 to 2007 “by an annual average of 510,000
individuals”); see also Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Overall Number of U.S. Unauthorized
Immigrants Holds Steady Since 2009, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 20, 2016),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/09/20/overall-number-of-u-s-unauthorized-immigrantsholds-steady-since-2009/.
110 See Hanson et al., supra note 108, at 2, 4-5, 30-44.
111 See id. at 2 (reporting that “the overall population of low-skilled immigrants of
working age remained stable” between 2007 and 2014, after “rising from 8.5 million
to 17.8 million” from 1990 to 2007).
112 See Parlapiano, supra note 7 (discussing proposed plans to phase out the
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program).
113 See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 414 (finding that “today’s
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a false and outdated stereotype of the average immigrant to the United
States.
Current immigration policies have already successfully promoted
the immigration of those with higher levels of education. Existing
categories of employment-based immigration already require high
levels of education, skill, or wealth, and the RAISE Act seems unlikely
to offer much improvement over these visa categories.114 Even familysponsored immigration is subject to an exclusion ground that denies
visas to those deemed “likely at any time to become a public
charge.”115 This determination not only already takes into account the
education, skills, assets, and age of the prospective immigrant but also,
since 1996, has required sponsors to sign legally binding affidavits of
support.116 Since 1996, these sponsorship requirements, which
obligate sponsors to support all the relatives that they sponsor for
immigration and to demonstrate the means to do so, have raised
barriers that tend to screen out less educated family-sponsored
immigrants.117 Furthermore, in “in determining the eligibility and the
amount of benefits” of these family-sponsored immigrants “for any
Federal means-tested public benefits program,” federal law deems the
“income and resources” of these family-sponsored immigrants to
include the “income and resources” of anyone who executed one of

immigrants have more people in the highest educational groups and fewer in the
lowest”); Richard Fry, Today’s Newly Arrived Immigrants Are the Best-Educated Ever,
PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/10/05/
todays-newly-arrived-immigrants-are-the-best-educated-ever/.
114 See Gelatt, supra note 86 (noting that the RAISE Act brings at best “slight”
changes to “the employment-based immigration system,” with “the points structure
largely echoing the existing preference for higher-educated, higher-paid workers or for
investors”); Alex Nowrasteh, Sens. Cotton and Perdue’s Bill to Cut Legal Immigration
Won’t Work and Isn’t an Effective Bargaining Chip, CATO INST. (Aug. 2, 2017),
https://www.cato.org/blog/sens-cotton-perdues-bill-cut-legal-immigration-wont-workisnt-effective-bargaining-chip (noting that the RAISE Act “does not increase skilled
immigration at all” because it “does not increase the numerical cap” for employmentbased immigration).
115 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A) (2018).
116 See id. § 1182(a)(4)(B) (listing factors to be taken into account in applying this
exclusion ground); id. § 1182(a)(4)(C) (requiring a sponsor to execute “an affidavit of
support”).
117 See id. § 1183. The obligation to support family-sponsored immigrants would
tend to prevent or deter sponsorship for the least educated immigrants, who would be
expected to earn the lowest wages and be the most likely to become eligible for
means-tested public benefits in the future. See Chang, Migration as International Trade,
supra note 79, at 404-06 (noting the barriers to sponsorship created by the
requirement of affidavits of support).
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these affidavits of support.118 Thus, family-sponsored immigrants are
less likely to receive means-tested public benefits than other
immigrants who are otherwise similarly situated. Furthermore, familysponsored immigrants are especially likely to adapt well to our labor
market because their relatives in the United States can facilitate
integration into our economy and our society. Finally, in a world in
which countries compete to attract global talent, the ability to sponsor
relatives for immigration may give the United States an advantage over
other destinations in recruiting the most skilled immigrants.119 These
considerations suggest that family-sponsored immigration confers net
benefits on natives, especially since 1996, making it especially
perverse for the RAISE Act to target this category of immigrants for
new restrictions.
D. Youth at the Time of Entry
Even immigrants with less than a high-school education will have a
positive fiscal impact if they immigrate while they are still young.
Recall that youth at the time of entry is an important factor
determining the total fiscal impact of an immigrant. Under the most
reasonable assumptions considered by the National Academies, even
the average recent immigrant with less than a high-school education
who enters while less than twenty-five years old will have a positive
total fiscal impact of $56,000 in net present value in 2012 dollars.120
This empirical evidence indicates that the RAISE Act is especially
perverse when it imposes new restrictions on the immigration of
children. The RAISE Act would continue to allow U.S. citizens and
permanent resident aliens to sponsor minor children for immigration
but would restrict the class of eligible children, by bringing the age
limit down from twenty-one to eighteen years old.121 This restriction
would exclude young immigrants who are especially likely to
contribute to the public treasury.
President Trump’s decision to rescind DACA is similarly perverse
from a fiscal perspective. The eligibility criteria for DACA ensures that
beneficiaries immigrated while younger than sixteen years old and will
118

8 U.S.C. § 1631(a) (2018).
See Chang, Migration as International Trade, supra note 79, at 400-06.
120 See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 446. Similarly, the NRC found that
under its baseline scenario, the average immigrant who arrives at age twenty-one or
younger will have a positive fiscal impact, even if the immigrant has less than a highschool education. See NRC, supra note 20, at 358.
121 See Reforming American Immigration for a Strong Economy Act, S. 1720, 115th
Cong. § 4(a)(1) (2017); Gelatt, supra note 86.
119
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have at least a high-school education or the equivalent.122 These young
and educated immigrants are especially likely to confer net benefits on
natives through the public treasury. The expiration of their
employment authorization or their deportation would perversely
undermine their ability to contribute to the economic welfare of
natives through their participation in the labor market and the
payment of taxes. These are immigrants we should be eager to keep in
our workforce and in our tax base; they should not be subject to
removal. Congress would be serving the nation’s economic interests to
grant legal status to DACA recipients and other immigrants like them,
without the restrictions imposed by the RAISE Act on legal
immigration.
III. THE ALTERNATIVE OF LIBERALIZING REFORMS
Immigration reform could promote more skilled immigration
without the RAISE Act’s drastic cuts to immigration levels. For
example, although the White House cites the points systems used to
select immigrants in Canada and Australia as models for the RAISE
Act,123 both of those countries also admit immigrants at much higher
rates than the United States. As a fraction of their populations, Canada
allows immigration levels more than twice as high as allowed under
U.S. policies, and Australia allows immigration levels more than three
times as high as allowed under U.S. policies.124 In fact, as a fraction of
their populations, both Canada and Australia admit more family-based
immigrants than the United States.125 If Congress were to take Canada
and Australia as models for immigration reform in the United States,
then reform would take the form of liberalization rather than more
severe restrictions.

122 See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the
United States as Children (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.
123 See President Donald J. Trump Backs RAISE Act, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 2, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-backs-raiseact/ (describing the RAISE Act as using a system “similar to the merit-based immigration
systems used by Canada and Australia”).
124 See Nowrasteh, supra note 114 (noting that in 2013, while U.S. immigration
was equal to 0.31% of the U.S. population, Canadian immigration was equal to 0.74%
of Canada’s population, and Australian immigration was equal to 1.1% of Australia’s
population).
125 Id.
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A. The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Proposed in 2013
The comprehensive immigration reform bill passed by the Senate in
2013 would have liberalized our immigration laws in various respects.
Like the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would have adopted a new meritbased points system for visas, but unlike the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill
would have added this category of visas to the existing employmentbased immigration categories rather than replacing these categories.126
Furthermore, the 2013 bill would have not only legalized many
unauthorized immigrants already in the United States but also taken
significant steps to address the problem of backlogs in our current
system for legal immigration and expanded access to visas in several
other respects.
First, unlike the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would have provided
sufficient visas to clear existing visa backlogs within seven years.127
Unauthorized immigrants given legal status by the bill would not
adjust their provisional status to permanent resident status until those
backlogs were eliminated.128 These legalized immigrants would
generally have to spend ten years in provisional status and would go to
the back of the line for permanent resident status, behind those who
have been waiting patiently for their immigration visas.129
Second, unlike the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would have treated
spouses and children of lawful permanent resident aliens as
“immediate relatives,” which would exempt them from quotas
entirely.130 Spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens can already
enter as “immediate relatives” without any ceilings.131 The 2013 bill
would have extended this treatment to the spouses and minor children
of lawful permanent resident aliens. This solution would give priority
to nuclear families and avoid backlogs for these relatives without
taking immigration visas from any other categories.
Third, unlike the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would also have
eliminated all quotas on the most skilled employment-based
immigrants, including those with extraordinary ability, outstanding
professors and researchers, multinational executives and managers,
those with doctorate degrees, physicians, or workers who recently
126 See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization
Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. §§ 2301, 2302 (2013).
127 See id. § 2302.
128 See id. § 2102 (specifying application procedures for adjustment of status).
129 See id. § 2302(c)(3)(B) (requiring at least ten years of legal status before
adjustment to permanent resident status).
130 See id. § 2305.
131 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2018).
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received advanced degrees in science, technology, engineering, or
mathematics (“STEM”) fields from universities in the United States.132
These STEM immigrants would also be exempt from labor certification
requirements.133 Furthermore, the spouses and children of
employment-based immigrants would not count toward quotas, which
will allow more of these skilled immigrants to enter.134 By eliminating
or liberalizing quantitative restrictions on both family-sponsored and
employment-based immigration, the 2013 bill would have eliminated
or reduced backlogs and thus would have been far better than the
RAISE Act at increasing the economic and fiscal benefits of
immigration.
Fourth, like the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would have eliminated
ceilings based on the country of origin from all employment-based
immigrant visas.135 These per country quotas have caused long waits
for immigrants from the two most populous countries in the world,
China and India. Like the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would allocate
these visas on a country-neutral basis. This reform would be even
better if it also applied to family-based visas, which should also be
available without any discrimination based on national origin.
Discrimination based on national origin needlessly introduces costly
distortions in the allocation of visas.136
Fifth, like the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would have eliminated
immigration visas for siblings of U.S. citizens, but unlike the RAISE
Act, the 2013 bill would have eliminated such visas for adult children
of U.S. citizens only if those children are married and more than
thirty-one years old.137 Although the 2013 bill would needlessly
impose these new restrictions on family-sponsored immigration, at
least under the 2013 bill, they would have an alternative. Under the
2013 bill, in the future, these relatives of U.S. citizens could apply for
immigration visas under a new merit-based points system, which
would award points based on factors such as education, employment
132

See S. 744 § 2307(b)(1).
See id. § 2307(b)(2).
134 See id. § 2307(b)(1).
135 See S. 744 § 2306; Reforming American Immigration for a Strong Economy Act,
S. 1720, 115th Cong. § 5(b) (2017).
136 See Howard F. Chang, Liberal Ideals and Political Feasibility: Guest-Worker
Programs as Second-Best Policies, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 465, 471 (2002)
[hereinafter Liberal Ideals]; Alan O. Sykes, International Cooperation on Migration:
Theory and Practice, 80 U. CHL. L. REV. 315, 330-31 (2013) (drawing an analogy
between distortions due to visa discrimination and trade diversion due to
discrimination in tariffs).
137 See S. 744 § 2307(a)(1).
133
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experience, and youth, with at least some weight placed on family
reunification.138 Like the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill designed its points
system to select those expected to have the most positive effect on the
U.S. economy, but unlike the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would award
some points for family ties to U.S. citizens.139
Thus, although proponents of the RAISE Act cite Canada as a model
for its points system, the 2013 bill included a points system that would
more closely resemble the points system used by Canada, which also
awards points based on family ties. The Canadian system recognizes
that an adult relative living in Canada improves the ability of an
immigrant to adapt to the Canadian economy and society. In fact, the
Canadian system awards points for a far broader set of relatives than
those currently allowed to sponsor relatives under the existing system
in the United States.140 The points system in the 2013 bill would have
acknowledged not only the moral relevance of family reunification but
also the economic advantages of having a family network in the United
States to facilitate adaptation and integration into our society. A points
system would perform this role even better by awarding points for a
broader set of relatives, as the Canadian system does.
Sixth, unlike the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would have provided
nonimmigrant visas for family-sponsored immigrants to enter, live in,
and work in the United States while waiting for approval of their
immigration visas.141 Thus, in the future, backlogs would not prevent
the reunification of families nor delay the contributions that
immigrants can make to our economy through the labor market or the
public treasury. This reform would improve the expected economic
and fiscal impact of each family-sponsored immigrant by allowing
each relative to spend more productive years in the United States as a
worker and taxpayer.142
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See id. § 2301(a)(1).
See id. (awarding points to siblings and married sons and daughters of citizens).
140 Canada awards “adaptability” points to an immigrant for not only parents, children,
and siblings but also grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces, and nephews
living in Canada, whether as a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident. See Six Selection
Factors – Federal Skilled Workers (Express Entry), GOV’T OF CAN., https://www.
canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/immigrate-canada/expressentry/become-candidate/eligibility/federal-skilled-workers/six-selection-factors-federalskilled-workers.html#toc5 (last visited Sept. 9, 2018).
141 See S. 744 § 2309.
142 For a similar proposal to allow prospective immigrants waiting in backlogs to
enter on nonimmigrant visas while waiting for their immigration visas, see Chang,
Liberal Ideals, supra note 136, at 466-67.
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Finally, unlike the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would have created new
nonimmigrant visa programs for less skilled workers: one program for
agricultural visas and another for other workers.143 These W visas
would allow workers to enter for a three-year period and would be
renewable.144 These visas would allow workers within each category to
leave one employer to work for another employer registered with the
program, unlike past programs for guest workers, including the
Bracero program, which typically tied each guest worker to a specific
employer.145 The freedom to leave one employer and to accept
employment with another would give workers more power to assert
their rights against employers and thus prevent abuses, without
sacrificing the economic benefits that natives derive in the labor
market from employing alien workers.146
In fact, an ideal program would offer the guest worker even more
mobility than the 2013 bill did, including the ability to move freely
among all sectors of the economy, rather than confining any guest
workers to the agricultural sector.147 Full labor mobility would allow
workers to pursue the best employment offer as market conditions
change. This mobility would not only increase freedom and expand
opportunities for the guest worker but also improve the efficiency of
the labor market because it would allow workers to move among
sectors in response to shifts in the demand for their labor.
B. Nonimmigrant Visas
From the perspective of the economic interests of natives, these
nonimmigrant visas may be an effective response to concerns
regarding the fiscal impact of less skilled alien workers.148 Through
these guest-worker programs, natives enjoy the benefits of employing
these workers in the labor market but do not bear the fiscal burden of
providing the set of public benefits that these workers would receive if
they had permanent residence and access to citizenship through
naturalization. Although immigrants can gain full access to public
benefits upon naturalization, only those “admitted for permanent
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See S. 744 §§ 2231, 4702.
See id. §§ 2232, 4703.
145 See id.; see also Howard F. Chang, Guest Workers and Justice in a Second-Best
World, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 3, 7 (2008) [hereinafter Guest Workers].
146 See Chang, Liberal Ideals, supra note 136, at 470-71.
147 See Chang, Guest Workers, supra note 145, at 7-8.
148 See id. at 4.
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residence” may naturalize as U.S. citizens.149 Guest workers admitted
on nonimmigrant visas are not admitted as permanent residents and
are therefore not eligible for most public benefits and are not eligible
for naturalization.
Our laws generally exclude not only unauthorized immigrants but
also nonimmigrants from a broad range of public benefits. With only
narrow exceptions, these aliens are ineligible for “any Federal public
benefit.”150 Because nonimmigrant visas can give less skilled alien
workers access to our labor markets without granting full access to the
benefits available to citizens, these visas may allow the most liberal
admissions policies possible for these aliens without imposing a fiscal
burden on natives.
By allowing natives to enjoy gains from trade with guest workers in
the labor market, the approach adopted by the 2013 bill would be
more likely to promote the economic welfare of natives than the
RAISE Act. In fact, we could even go beyond the 2013 bill and
accommodate the desire of some guest workers to remain by allowing
guest workers to renew their visas for an indefinite number of multiple
periods.151 As long as we restrict their access to public benefits, they
seem unlikely to impose a net fiscal burden on the public treasury.152
Such a program, however, raises the prospect of de facto permanent
residents with only restricted access to citizenship and to public
benefits. If we expand our objectives beyond a narrow focus on the
economic interests of natives, then we may find this prospect
troubling. The political theorist Michael Walzer argues that a society
that relies on guest workers for labor is “a little tyranny” in which
guest workers are ruled “by a band of citizen-tyrants.”153 From the
perspective of the interests of the guest workers, or from the
perspective of principles of “political justice” in a “democratic state,”
the ideal policy would provide the option of lawful permanent
residence and ultimately, access to citizenship.154
149

8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2018).
Id. § 1611(a).
151 See Chang, Guest Workers, supra note 145, at 12 (suggesting that we “allow
guest workers to renew their nonimmigrant visas with no limit on the number of
possible renewals”).
152 See id. (citing empirical evidence suggesting that a guest worker “would
probably have a net positive impact” even if the worker “has less than a high-school
education”).
153 MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 52,
58 (1983).
154 Id. at 60 (arguing that the right to citizenship through naturalization should be
“subject only to certain constraints of time and qualification”).
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C. The Path to Citizenship
To better reflect democratic ideals, we could offer a path to
citizenship for guest workers who compile a sufficiently long record of
employment while avoiding any criminal activity. In fact, under the
2013 bill, workers on W visas could apply for permanent residence
through a merit-based points system, which would award points for
each year spent working lawfully in the United States up to a limit of
twenty points.155 With a path to possible permanent residence and
ultimately citizenship, admission as a guest worker need not imply
permanent status as an alien.
Would a path to citizenship for less skilled immigrants raise the
prospect of a fiscal burden? Not if we require guest workers to spend
years in nonimmigrant status first, which would delay their access to
the full set of public benefits that are available to citizens. This delay
would improve the fiscal impact of each guest worker who adjusts
status to that of a permanent resident. The longer the delay, the
greater the improvement in the fiscal impact of each immigrant. The
estimates generated by the NRC for the fiscal impact of immigrants
suggest that we could allow even less skilled immigrants to naturalize
without imposing a net fiscal burden if a sufficiently long period with
limited access to public benefits has passed.156
These observations would apply not only to guest workers on W
visas but also legalized immigrants with provisional status. The 2013
Senate bill would have allowed these aliens to work and pay taxes in
the United States without access to specified public benefits while
seeking permanent resident status.157 By denying legalized immigrants
access to public benefits for many years, the 2013 bill would have

155 See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization
Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. § 2301(a)(1) (2013).
156 Taking the fiscal impact of an immigrant’s descendants into account, the NRC
found that the average immigrant with less than a high-school education imposes a
net fiscal burden of only $13,000 in net present value in 1996 dollars under the NRC’s
baseline scenario. See NRC, supra note 20, at 334. The NRC also found that the 1996
welfare legislation would improve the fiscal impact of the average immigrant by
$8,000 by excluding immigrants from seven specified means-tested benefits for only
their first five years in the United States. See id. at 339. Nonimmigrants are ineligible
for “any Federal public benefit,” which includes an even broader set of benefits than
those considered by the NRC. 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2012). Thus, the NRC estimates
suggest that a sufficiently long period of nonimmigrant status would avoid the fiscal
burden otherwise predicted for an immigrant with less than a high-school education.
157 See S. 744 §§ 2101(a), 2211(c)(3) (restricting access to public benefits for
legalized immigrants and for guest workers).
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improved the fiscal impact of each immigrant while still providing a
path to permanent resident status.
In reality, access to citizenship is a matter of degree. A guest worker
could have the opportunity to adjust status only after a short period in
the United States or only after a long period. We can demand many
years of work experience in the United States, or we can impose less
demanding requirements. Congress could choose any point along this
continuum to satisfy critics concerned about the impact of less skilled
immigrants on the public treasury. By adjusting the number of points
a guest worker could earn through years of work in the United States
and by adjusting the number of immigrant visas issued through this
points system, we can adjust the guest worker’s prospects for
permanent residence and the number of years that a guest worker
could expect to wait to adjust status.
In fact, the flexibility of such a points system is a virtue that might
also facilitate a political compromise on a path to citizenship for
unauthorized immigrants granted legal status. In 2013, some
Republicans in the House of Representatives expressed a willingness to
grant legal status to unauthorized immigrants, but they also objected
to the “special” path to citizenship provided by the Senate bill.158 A
possible compromise would allow legalized immigrants to apply for
permanent resident status through the same immigration system that
is open to all prospective immigrants. If Congress were to liberalize
that immigration system enough, so that enough legalized immigrants
could have a realistic chance of eventually obtaining permanent
resident status, then we could have the basis of a compromise that
might finally allow comprehensive immigration reform to emerge from
Congress.
CONCLUSION
Although the proponents of the RAISE Act advance economic claims
on behalf of their restrictionist proposals, these claims do not hold up
under scrutiny. In fact, the economic and fiscal effects of immigration
imply net benefits for natives, both in the labor market and through
the public sector. Economists estimate that immigrant workers add

158 See, e.g., Julia Preston, Illegal Immigrants Are Divided Over Importance of
Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/21/us/
illegal-immigrants-divided-over-the-importance-of-citizenship.html (reporting on
Republicans in Congress open to an “appropriate legal status for unlawful
immigrants” and “allowing those with family ties here to naturalize eventually
through regular channels” but opposed to “any special path to becoming Americans”).

144

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 52:111

billions of dollars per year to the real income of natives in the United
States by supplying their labor to our labor market. Furthermore,
immigration also makes us better off by increasing tax revenues in the
United States. These findings suggest that higher levels of immigration
would produce even larger benefits for the U.S. economy. So why not
liberalize our immigration policies instead of imposing new
restrictions?
The comprehensive immigration reform bill passed by the Senate in
2013 would have liberalized our immigration laws in various respects
and thus would have done a much better job than the RAISE Act in
serving the economic interests of natives. The RAISE Act’s hostility
toward family-sponsored immigration, in particular, lacks a sound
basis in empirical evidence or careful economic analysis. The 2013 bill
would improve the economic and fiscal benefits of immigration by
clearing backlogs and expanding access to both immigrant and
nonimmigrant visas. The liberalizing proposals in the 2013 bill
provide a promising foundation for comprehensive immigration
reform and should be the basis for future changes to the laws
governing legal immigration in the United States.

